Introduction
Reform of the international financial architecture is a dynamic and rapidly changing problem that by nature does not have a definitive answer. Hence, one would expect substantial disagreement on reform measures among the contributors herein. Remarkably, there is a strong consensus that emerges here. This consensus stands in stark contrast to the often "contradictory and mutually incompatible" (Eichengreen, 1999. p. I) proposals o ffered elsewhere, primarily by economists and members of the policy community based in the United States.
This concluding chapter considers the views of some ofthe leading, U.S.-based authorities in the current debate on strengthening the international financial system , to identify their areas of overlap and divergence. The resulting, lengthy list of recommendations they provide is incrementalist in nature. It offers a baseline point of comparison for the evaluations assembled here. There is a general acceptance among these established authorities of the conventional wisdom on reforming the international financial architecture. The scholars and practitioners assembled in this volume. however. with their additional perspectives from Europe and Asia and North America beyond the United States, call for a bolder approach . They challenge the presumed effectiveness of many of the proposed reforms, offer new insights on encouraging stabilising behaviour of financial market participants, and add much-needed perspectives on the political process that is required for the development, acceptance, and monitoring of said reforms.
This chapter begins with a brief overview of the perspectives of some of the leading scholars on the international financial system . It then summarises the perspectives in the context of the core issue areas identified in the introduction to this text. Finally, it highlights the views offered in thi s volume, indicating the points of overlap and divergence with the conventional wisdom previously offered.
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The Conventional Wisdom: A Brief Survey Arguably the best-kn own contributi o n to the current debate is Barry Eichengreen's book, Toward a New Financial Architecture: A Pracl ical Pos/-Asia Agenda ( 1999) . A prolifi c wri ter o n th e hi story of the inte rn atio na l monetary system, Eichengreen is we ll pos iti oned to assembl e and assess th e v iews a nd proposa ls o n reform th at have been adva nced by many pro m ine nt indiv idual s a nd authorities . I Eichengreen arg ues that most of the favo ured pro posa ls are incompatibl e j w ith on e another because di fferent peopl e view th e probl em of finan c ia l instability from divergent perspecti ves. His own pro posa ls are advanced, in contrast, on the bas is of fi ve clear ass umptions, as fo ll ows. First, fin ancia l liberalisation allows market to allocate ca pital in the most effic ie nt manner and, therefore, has s ig nificant benefits. Secondly, a!1d in contrast to others (such as Harold Ja mes 1999), integrati o n of fin ancial markets is irreversibl e. Thirdly, information asymm etries are pervas ive in fin ancia l markets a nd , th e refore, financi a l safety nets are needed in light of the insta bility gene rated by these asymmetries. Fourthly, bankruptcy codes are needed, as info rm ati on and transacti ons costs prevent markets from pro mptly reso lv ing fi nanc ia l cri ses. Finally, po litica l con s iderations w ill influence economic refo rm . Eichengreen chooses, as do the oth er establi shed scholars rev iewed he re, to offer " recommendation s [that] may seem unambitio us .. . but have a chance of being implemented" ( 1999, p. 4) . Hi s approach is to o ffer proposal s that a re practi cal in light of the fact that tho ugh financ ial markets are everincreasin gly global , th ey continue to be regul ated at the nationa l leve l. Hi recommendations fo rm the benchmark for thi s brief rev iew and a re summarised as fo llows.
Because of the pro blem of asy mm etric in fo rm ati o n in fin a nc ia l markets. accounting and auditing standards sho uld be adva nced and ado pted. T he adopti on of standards, and the mo nito rin g of compliance wi ll req uire a coo rdinated effort among intern ati o nal , nationa l, and pri va te secto r bodi es and sho uld be addressed within the context of reforming the Intern ati ona l Monetary Fund. [n regard to improved info rm ati on, Eichengreen spec ifica ll y call s for :
Better information on businesses, banks. and sovereign nations, inc luding: ri gorous disclosure requirements; the use of intern ationall y recogni sed auditing and acco unting standard s; po
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improved corporate governance standards so that claimants can monitor and control ; financial deci sions; intern~ltional monitoring of compliance and its public di ssemination .
The pace offinancialmarket liberalisation has been much more rapid than increases in supervision and regulation, particularly in emerging economie What is needed, therefore , is:
Improved supervision and regulation olfinancial markets and market participants, such as:
improved ri sk-management techniques of banks; improved regulation and supervision; limiting or taxing bank (principally foreign currency denominated) borrowing abroad, specifically Chilean-style capital-inflow taxes.
I n regard to debt clauses, Eichengreen admits that no single country would pursue this alone as it might send an unfortunate signal to the markets. Hence. actions of this type can be accomplished only on a co-ordinated basis. Hi s recommendation here is:
International Debt Restructuring, such as:
adding majority voting and shareholding clauses to loan contracts; collective-representation clauses, including; provisions for a representative to coordinate creditors in the case of sovereign debt, and clauses providing that a minimum percentage of bondholders must agree for legal action to be taken ; the creation of standing committees of creditors; IMF lending in arrears, when appropriate.
Eichengreen argues that the IMF must realise that it cannot so lve all the problems of the international financia l system by itself. The IMF must work with appropriate private sector organisations.and international comm ittees. In addition , the IMF should promote exchange rate flexibility as this will encourage agents to hedge foreign exchange exposures, reducing inso lvency that results from unexpected exchange rate changes and Chilean-sty le ca pital controls. Hence, he calls for:
Reform of the IMF. to include:
working with appropriate bodies to establish standards:
.
'
224 Shaping a New I l7IernCllional Financial SY.I'Iem mo nito rin g membe r coun try com plia nce w ith th ese sta nda rds: becoming a pro-active coordinato r of de bt restru cturing: enha nc ing its legitimacy thro ugh g reate r di sc los ure and transparency. fo rm in g a new consensus of appropri ate macroecono m ic po l ic ies in lig ht of today s integrated fin a nc ia l markets, pro moting C h ilea n-ty le capita l control s, and encouraging fl ex ible exchange rates.
Shortly afte r Eic hengreen's ana lys is, A la n Blinde r offered hi s own Ei~hl Steps to a New Financial Order ( 1999) . Both hi s theme and recomm endati o ns echo those of Eic hen green. Blinder ma inta ins th at fin anc ia l insta bility cannot be e l im inated , but sees th e c urrent s ituati on of numerous a nd severe c rises as unacce pta bl e. Blinder a lso conc urs th at ostentati o us proposa ls are a dead-e nd and that it is " Better to sti ck w ith mo re modest pl ans th at require li ttl e or no in stitution-building. T he wo rld ' s poor cann ot wa it fo r grand edifices to be built" ( 1999, p. 53) .
Five of the e ight steps reco mme nded by Blinder are in clear agreeme nt w ith the proposals of Eic he ngreen: Flex ible exchange rates. restri cting excess ive short-term bo rrow ing in fo re ign currency, sound mac roecono m ic a nd fin a nc ia l po li c ies (partic ul arl y imp roved bank supervis ion and acco untin g and a uditing sta nd a rd s), recons iderati on of l MF a usteri ty progra ms inlightof the modern internatio na l eco nomy, a nd e tabli shing proced ures fo r de bt settleme nt, inc luding co ll ecti ve act io n cla uses. In additi on. Blinde r arg ues fo r a pro pe r sequenci ng of capita l market libera li sation. T hi s inc ludes conside ratio n of C hilean-sty le contro l o n short-term ca pita l infl ows a nd tempe rin g the IM Ps encourage me nt of pre mature li bera li satio n. Blinde r a rg ues that the 1M F pays too muc h attenti on to cred itors a nd too I itt le to the innocent bystanders in a fin a nc ia l c rises. Hence, he argues th at more resources s ho uld be devoted to protecting the soc ia l safety nets of nati o ns fro m experi enc in g a fin anc ia l me ltdown. Fina ll y, he argues fo r preventat ive fun ds. s uc h as the lM F's Contingent C red it Line, to be ava il a ble fo r countr ies th at fo ll ow sound po lic ies, in ord er to keep spectato rs at bay. He does not. however, go as fa r as to recomme nd reg iona l ag reeme nts, th o ug h he does not address these expli c itl y o r rul e th e m out.
A third set of pro posals has come from the Coun c il o n Fore ign Re lati ons. w hi c h in 199 8 spo nsored th e Inde pe nd e nt Task Force of th e Intern ati o na l Fina nc ia l A rchitecture. Its rep0l1 was autho red by Mo rri s Go ldste in (Coun c il o n Fore ign Re lati o ns 1999). T he bas ic princi ples of the repol1 i th at the burde n of refo rm is o n the emerg ing eco no mies and the ir credi tors. but th at partic ipati on is required by th e industri a lised econo mi es as is refo rm a nd
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redirection of the IMF and th e World Bank. The Coun c il offers seven recomme ndatio ns. Five o f th ese pa ra lle l th ose of Eiche ng reen (who was a member of the Task Force) and Blinde r, th o ugh th e context is s li g htl y di ffe rent.
T he Task Force recommends th at countri es that pract ice "good housekeeping", (whi ch includes sound mac roecono mi c po li cy, a stro ng a nd we ll-regulated ba nking system, compli ance with intern ationa l tanda rd s for di sclosure, and avo idance of excess ive sho l1-te rm bo rrow in g) be rewa rd ed w ith mo re favo ura ble IMF lending te rm s a nd lower reg ul atory ca pita l requirements fo r ba nks lending to these coun tri es . In addi t io n. it pro poses avo idance of excess ive short-term capital flo ws w ith C hi lean-sty le capita l contro ls, flexibl e exchange rates, private secto r burden sharing, and co ll ecti ve acti o n cl auses, a nd reform and refocus ing of IMF a nd Wo rld Ba nk respons ibilities.
The Task Force a lso suggests less IMF lendin g, spec ifica ll y a return to norm a l lendin g limits of 100 to 300 percent of country quota. T he be li ef he re is that less le nding w i II cha nge private age nts ' expectati o ns a bo ut future lendin g and reduce th e mo ra l haza rd pro ble m. Le nding sho uld focus o n smoothing operati ons in c urre ncy markets, he lp fi na nce ba nk re tructuring, a nd pro vide fo r soc ia l safety nets, as advocated by Blinde r. Fina ll y, the Task Forces advocates greate r po liti ca l support of reform measures. As w ith E ic he ng reen, there is an admiss ion that po litica l cons iderati o ns and w ill power will drive o r stymi e reform effo rts . T he Coun c il urge g reate r in vo lvement of the emerg ing economies in th e process. T hey ca ll o n th e Interim Committee, the F inanc ia l Stability Forum (FSF). and the pres idents of th e reg iona l deve lopme nts banks to conve ne a meeting of the fin a nce mini sters to set a n agenda a nd tim e line.
A fourth maj o r set of pro posa ls comes fro m a sy mpos ium w hose res ults were re po l1ed in the Journal of Economic Perspecti ves and umm ari sed by Fredric Mi shkin ( 1999) . T ho ug h th e sy mpos ium covered a great dea l of te rrito ry, three iss ue areas fo und in a ll of the pro posa ls above are trea ted in g reater deta il. T hese are th e ro le of intern ati ona l in stituti o ns, banking stability, a nd capital contro ls. Mi shkin and Rogoff ( 1999) co ncur w ith th e Coun c il on Forei gn Relations that a n intern ati ona l le nd e r of last resort is need ed, but a rgue it is not practica l to env is io n o ne w ith "deep pockets" . Mi shkin 's arg ument is based on the mora l haza rd pro ble m that is created wit h such a n instituti on w hile Rogoff foc usses o n th e amo unt of resources that wo uld be required. Rogoff reaches furth er, exam ining ma ny othe r pro posa ls fo r inte rn ati o na l instituti on formatio n and reform ati o n. inc luding th e estab li shme nt of a fi nanc ia l c ri s is ma nage r a nd an in te rn ati o na l bankruptcy court . He conc ludes that no ne of th ese proposa ls are feas ible at thi s tim e. In thi s sympos ium , Caprio and Ho no han ( 1999) dea l w ith th e pro ble m o f" ba nk ing stability in emerg ing coun tri es. T hey injti a ll y a sert that capi ta l requi rements are not suffic ie nt for dea lin g w ith banks in e me rg in g nat ions. as in many of th ese nat io n fin anc ia l libera li satio n occ urred fas te r th an th e establi shm ent of adequate regul ati on a nd superv is io n of inte rm edi a ri es .
He nce, what is needed is better and increased superv is io n of interm edi a ri es in these na t io ns. As they see it, a princ iple prob lem that po li cymake rs mu st gras p is th at the so luti o ns th at wo rk in indu stri a l ised econo m ies may not wo rk I in emerging economi es because of di ffe re nces in marke t vo latil ity a nd the institut io na l setting. O ppress ive regul ati o n, however, i not the o lu t io n. A n e nv iro nm e nt that prov ides a framework of incenti ves th at encourages di vers ificati o n and ba lanc ing ofl oa ns and competitio n is one th at enhance th e efficiency and sta bility o f these banking syste ms .
• Sebasti a n Ed ward s ( 1999) tas k is to cons ide r the cap ita l contro ls recomm e nd ed in a ll of th e pro posa ls noted a bove. He argues th at the ev ide nce shows th at contro ls o n capita l outfl ows are ineffecti ve w hile the be nefi ts of contro ls o n the inflow of capita l, such as th ose used by C hil e, are overrated . Nonethe less, contro ls on sho rt-te rm capita l infl ows may exte nd the matu rity of debt and , therefore, be a usefullemporary stopgap measure. Ultim ate ly, w hat is needed is th e o bv ious medley of prudent macroecono mic po li c ies, banking regul atio n a nd superv is io n, and fl ex ible exchange rates.
The Consensus of the Conventional Wisdom
T he a utho rs rev iewed above agree th at th e wo rst of the As ia n c ri IS I now past, but that s imilar fin anc ia l fa ilu res are inev itab le in the future. g iven th e c urre nt e nv iro nme nt. Libera li sed fi na nc ia l mark ets w ill a lways be pro ne to se iz in g up . No reform effort, no matter how comp rehe ns ive it mi ght be. ca n compl ete ly e liminate thi s as pect. Li bera li sed fi na nc ia l markets are celta inl y beneficia l, as they di rect capita l to its most prod ucti ve fun ctio n. Yet w he n markets a re libera l ised prio r to necessary III icroecono m ic and mac roecono lll ic re form s (suc h as pro per mo netary, fi sca l, and exchange rate po lic ies. a nd a ppro pri ate ba nkin g and do mesti c fina nc ia l market regu lati o n a nd supe rv is io n), large and sudde n infl ows and o utfl ows of sho rt-term cap ita l ca n overwhe lm a n eme rg in g nati on's syste m of interm edi ari es, leading to a fin anc ia l me lt-down. It appears th at thi s is prec ise ly w hat happened in East As ia from 1997 o nwa rd.
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T ho ugh financial markets a re becom ing more g loba lly integrated. th ey re main regul ated at th e domestic leve l. For emergi ng nat io ns th at re ly heav i Iy on their domestic ba nking system fo r the a llocatio n of capi tal. a nd that have less than sufficie nt competition, regul atio n and superv is io n, I iberali atio n has proved to be a risky process. A great deal needs to be done here . T he indu strial ised nation s need to set the exampl e for the emerging natio ns through the approval and adoption of acco untin g. disclosure. a nd aud iting standards. Muc h is now bei ng done in generat ing suc h sta nd ards. T he difficult task that lies ahead will be e nsurin g their accepta nce a nd mo nitorin g compliance with them . The G7 , IM F. a nd the committees o r nat io na l regulators must co-ordinate their efforts in this regard . T hey must further dev ise a syste m of incentives that encourages market partici pants and the governments of the eme rg ing and deve lo pin g natio ns to compl y .
There is no question that informatio nal asym metri es pervade tinancial markets and that this ty pe of market fai lure is amplified in in te rnatio na l transactions. Improvements in transparency and surve ill ance are important.
but in and of themselves will not accompli sh much. Rather, there is a need for more draconian measures such as capital contro ls o n sho rt-term intlows. Thi s ty pe of measure is offered with trepidation. but offered no nethe less. The purpose is to extend the average maturity of debt and reduce the rei iance on bank bo rrowing from abroad .
Private sector in vo lvement is certainl y a commo n e le me nt of a ll the proposa ls above. Each col lection has ca ll ed fo r share ho lde r c lauses o n loans a nd collective-representation clauses o n debt. These ty pes of measure have the potential to reduce th e quality of debt issued by sending the wrong ty pe of message to market participants. As a result. no nati on would unilate ra ll y adopt these measures. A coordinated effort is required. The prospect of a coordinated effort. however, seems unlikel y as longas the United States re main s firm in its opposition to reform in this area .
T he a rea that rece ives vil1ually no attentio n at a ll is the ro le of the G7 in the overall process. This is quite un fo rtunate a the G7. both at the leaders. and Finance Ministers leve l. re presentthe critica l political force necessa ry tor a ny reform to take pl ace . While ea rli er' G7 ac ti o n may have proven di sappointing in its foresight. tim e liness, and content ( Dani e ls 1999). as the Council on Foreign Relat ion s Task Force rightly argues. greater po litica l upport of reform efforts is needed. The G7. and the extended fora of the G7. are essentia l in coordinating the activities of the various bodies at wo rk o n the formation of standards, th e promulgation of such standard s. a nd th e encourage ment of their adoption .
Challenges and Contributions to the Conventional Wisdom
T he a na lyses offered in thi s vo lum e conta in a num ber of poi nts of conve rgence w ith the views presented a bove. However o n the who le they mo unt a c ha ll enge to the conventiona l w isdo m by add in g a more diverse and often bo lder view o n the o ri g in of recent crises. th e s pec ific directi o n to be ta ke n, a nd the po liti ca l process that w ill steer the entire o perati o n.
T here is a consensus on the be nefits of g lo ba li sati o n of fi na nc ia l markets th at is dri ven ho me in th e wo rk s of Ru gman and Danie ls. T hese a uth o rs a lso agree that sho rt-term capita l fl ows can be desta bili s ing, whe reas fo re ig n direct in vestm ent is not. Ru gman goes further on thi s issue by po inting o ut th at the process of integration is in fact dri ven by fore ign direct in vestm ent acti vitie of mult inatio na l e nterpri ses. T he authors di verge fro m th e conventi o na l w isdom by shi fti ng away fro m th e focus on short-te rm fl ows. as ca pita l contro ls o n sho rt-te rm inflows are, at best, second best po li c ies . In additi o n to the obv ious reforms needed in banking and fi nanc ia l market superv is io n and regul ati o n, wh at is ca lled fo r is a regio na l system of incentives that encourages lo ng-te rm in vestm e nt, as opposed to schemes th at d iscourage sho rt-te rm ca pita l. Indeed, Ru g man argues th at the lack of suc h a strategy is a cent ra l expla nati o n of the East As ian crisis.
T here is a lso much agree on th e pro per ro le of the IM P. Gia nnini concurs that there is a ro le fo r a le nd er of last reso rt. He leads th e de bate in a new directi on by a rguing that the IMP is a lready heading away fro m be ing a n international lender of last resort and toward becom ing a le nder o f credibi I ity.
T hat is, the IM F can provi de c redibility to othe rw ise soun d eco no mies that have experi enced a cris is by lending into arrears a nd by e na bling the m to access private capita l courses. Vo n Furstenberg adds, build ing o n Goodha rt ( 1999) , that bo rrowed mo ney should not be used to defend exchange rate pegs. What vo n Furste nbe rg a lso brings to th e de bate is the rea li sati on th at most of the cri s is countries have a bando ned pegged reg imes a nd the cha llenge now re ma in s one of fi nding the appro pri ate regime. It a ppears that regio na l arra ngeme nts are inev ita ble w ith many nati o na l c urrenc ies di sappearin g in the process.
T hat reform of ba nkin g supe rvis ion and regul ation is essenti a l to successful fin a nc ia l market regul ati on is unargua ble. Kiu chi . however. po in ts out that a c ri tica l e le me nt mi ss ing in the debate over reform is how po l itician
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compo und th e pro ble m by overriding banking offic ia ls a nd regul ato rs. 0 re fo rm , regardl ess of how we ll inte nti o ned it mi ght be. ca n be s uccess ful w itho ut pro pe r po litica l backin g. There is a need. th e refore. to deve lo p a lte rn ati ves to do mesti c ba nking systems th at a ll ow fo r direct fi nanc ing. He nce, Kiu c hi argues fo r the deve lo pment of a n As ia n bond mark et w hi c h wo uld replace som e of th e sho rt-term bank borrow ing a broad. and a lso extend the maturity of de bt.
A lack of the ty pe of transpa rency that is ca lled fo r in th e conventio na l w isdom had littl e to do with th e o ut brea k o r the East As ian c ri s is. as arg ued by vo n Furstenberg. In fo rm ati o n asymm etri es a re a n importa nt e leme nt in suc h c ri ses, but th e measures c urrentl y e nv is io ned w i II do I ittl e to prevent s im i lar c rises fro m occurring in th e future. What vo n Furste nbe rg brings to th e de bate is th e importance of political transpare ncy. T hat is, bei ng c lea r as to moti ves a nd to whom th e bene fits of reform w i II acc ru e. \;v i II do much to enhance th e credibility of th e re fo rm process itse lf. Wa lter echoes thi s scept ic ism about the impact of transparency and argues th at much mo re needs to be do ne in th e way of ba nk capital require me nts. Wa lte r concur w ith th e conve ntiona l w isdo m that a new mechani sm is needed to a ll ow ba nkruptcy and that the reca pitalisatio n offa iling fi nanc ia l instituti ons sho uld be ha lted.
The Role of the G7
A mong a ll the authors in thi s vo lume, there is a w ides pread co nsensus abo ut the central rol e the G7 pl ays in respo nding to intern ati o na l fi na nc ia l c ri es. and strengthe ning the inte rn ati ona l fi nanc ia l system to reduce the mass ive econo mic, po litica l and soc ia l costs w hi ch such cri s is can exact upon so many. Thi s consensus embraces the re levance and leade rship ro le of the G7 in these issues, its re lati onship to th e oth er bodi es charged with th e ir manage ment. the effective ness of its perfo rm a nce in cris is respo nse a nd system/ reconstru ct io n. a nd where a nd how it sho uld concentrate its efforts in th e fu ture.
The Relevance and Leadership Role of/he 0 7
The re is overwhe lmin g agreement that th e G7 and its leade rship have been. and sho uld be, centra l in th e process of responding to intern ati o na l fin a nc ia l cri ses and construct ing a new system to meet the needs of a now g loba l ised wo rld . Bay ne shows how res pondin g to c ri s is and reconstru cting the internati onal fin anc ia l system in its va ri o us dim e nsio ns has recurrentl y been 13() Shaping a ell' Im ernational Financial System the central tasks of the G7, and that it have been critica l in so lving diffe rence that have pers isted at lower levels, keeping up the press ure to ensure what members have agreed is properl y carried out, and in explain ing andj ust ify ing their actions to outside countri es and the broader public. Kirto n regards it, rather than the I MF or US alone, as play ing the central part during the cri sis of 1997-99. Dani els argues that the GTs perfo rm ance in coordin at ion and im pl ementation wi II determ ine the ultim ate success or fa i lure of the effort to reform the internati onal ti nancial system.
Even those with more cr itica l views admit its relevance. Kiuchi. amid st hi s ympathy for regional so lutions, views the 7 as hav ing an important leadership role in catalyzing needed action at an ea rl y stage, and in helping Asian nations deve lop guidel ines to help them deve lop their financial systems. Wood sees the G7 as central to the global coordination of economi c poli cies. even though he argues it has now become an "anac hroni sm" given the ri sing we ight of developin g countries, shi fts in trade compefiti veness, and the new vulnerabili ty among all nations brought by globali sat ion. Von Furstenberg admits the useful role the G7 played in end ors ing IM F incubated codes and in strengthenin g the IMF 's Interim Committee, even whil e recognis in g the limited relevance of such an emphas is. Walter suggests. in kee ping with th e Ameri ca n leadership model of international co-operation and G7 effect iveness (Putnam and Bay ne 1987) , that the G7 ca n playa key ro le in prov idin g th e United States with the j uni or partner it needs to wo rk with, in a world o f " Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs" . Gianini approves of the 7-inspired in fo rmal ways devi sed to deal with the Asian cri sis and Korea, and the GTs creation of the Financial Stability Forum . Onl y Rugman, wi th hi s emphasis on the role offoreign direct investment, multinational enterpri se ' s regional ism and regional in stitutions, implicitly casts doubt in the relevance of the G7 itse lf in the broader scheme.
The G 7 ' .\' Relationship to the Other Financial institutions
At the same tim e. th ere is an equally strong conviction that the G7 ca n act perfo rm its needed role if it works in tandem with the establi hed multilateral organi sati ons regional bodi es, in ways that incorporate more full y the wo rk of outside countries and pri vate sector fo rum s. Bay ne underscores the need to ground GTs decision in the form al constitutional and instituti onal structure of establi shed international organi sation such as the IM F if th ey are to be effecti ve in the long run . Kirton shows, consistent with the mode l of democrati c in stituti onali sm for explaining G8 perfo rmance (Kirton and Challenges and ConlrihUlion.l' ( 0 (h e C(}l7vel7liol1ol Wisdo/ll 231 Daniels 1999, Kokotsis and Daniels 1999) . how the G7 needed the IMF. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development(l RBD). a nd reg io na l development banks as a nest for catalysing co-operation and for securin g resources to help stem crisis of 1997-9. For Danie ls, it is the G7 that can help provide the badly needed clarification of the roles of the IMF a nd IBRD . Kiuchi calls for an enhancement of the IMF 's authority to deal with capital account liberalisation . For von Furstenberg, and Walter the I MF and BIS were central in generating the standards to secure greater transparency, with the G7 endorsing their work, although the former sees the IMF as poorly posi ti o ned to engender the needed moves away from floating exchan ge rate regimes and into the world of reg ional monetary union . For Rugman . in contrast, multilateral and plurilateral bodies such as the Organ isation for Econom ic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GAIT) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) have failed to provide the needed rules for investment liberalisation, while regional bodies are busy generating results .
The need to involve outsiders in the work of the G7 is underscored by many of the analyses in this volume. Kiuchi points to the need for reg ional arrangements such as an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) and regional policy coordination, or bilateral plans such as the New Miyazawa Initiative. Wood applauds the Cologne G7's decision to enlarge the FSF and give new responsibilities to the IMF 's renamed Internatio nal Finance and Monetary Committee, as the start of a much-needed process of greater inclusion. Kirton notes how the G7 broadened to include others through the FSF and G22 in devising the new system. Daniels echoes this plea to include large developing countries. Bayne, expanding on his earlier call (Bayne 1999 ) and noti ng the success of the process leading to the Co logne debt initiative, points to the importance, especially in the wake of the failed Seattle WTO meetin g, of better communication with public and civil soc iety actors.
The Effectiveness of G7 Action in Crisis Response and System Reconstruction .
All the authors point further to the wisdom and effectiveness ofG7 action in crisis response and system reform, although niost also identify in sta nces when G7 agreement and action was poorly conceived, insufficient, o r badly executed. Bayne's review of the G7's four maj or efforts durin g its first 25 years reveals a variable record, .ran g ing from a hi gh Iy but not tota lI y effect ive r ,
.' I 232 ShapinK a New Il7I ernaliunol Financial ~)).I'l ell/ respo nse in 1975, throug h to a muc h delayed impact on middle in come debt relief from 1982 onward, relief of debt of the poorest from 1988 o nward, a nd cris is response and ystem reconstructi on from 1994 to the present. Wood believes th e Co logne co mmunique makes a ignificant contribution to strengthe ning the internati onal financial architecture, bur give the repoli a very ca utious eva luati on, and one that expre ses skeptici sm abo ut the ab ility of the G7 to implement it effective ly in the absence of broader participation from the developing countries themselves . He furtherj ud ges the G 7 in ge ne ra I to be hi g hl y effect ive in macroeconomic co-ord inatio n. but note its ad hoc.
cases by case app roac h to developing country debt relief in the 1980s left the , system hi g hl y vulnerable to the crises of the 1990s. The hi ghest marks come fi'o m Kilion, who concludes the G7 beat markets in So uth Korea. Brazi I, and over private sector burden sharin g, and successfull y contained As ian a nd g loba l financial crises, if through th e provision of "just in tim e' "just e noug h' leadership . He concurs with Bayne that it was ultilTlate ly action by the G7 leaders themselves th at was needed, and that the G7 leaders were muc h better at responding to crises than at foreseeing and preve ntin g them. The economists in this vo lume substantially agree with this portrait. a ltho ugh offer more harsh judgements abo ut the market rationality of man y of the particular decisions the G7 produces. Kiuchi suggests the G7 has been effective in its de faCIO ta k of survei llance and coord inati on of excha nge rates . Daniels ees the G7 Fina nce mini ster' report to the leaders at the Co log ne Summit as a compre hen sive, hi gh quality document that reflects well the work being done by the G7 and others since the Halifax Summ it of 1995. a nd one that does an exce llent task of fram ing th e current situation. He does, however, note the G7 at Co logne provided little detail on private sector involvement in crisi prevention, and was not firm enough in its conclusion s o n exchange rate regimes. Walter, while implicitly approving the FSF. points to the need to address more basic and hitherto neglected i ue. Vo n Furstenberg remains the most critica l, declaring that its HI P Initi ative i a debt trap, that its approach to transparency o n Iy helps those at the top of the hi erarchy, that this approach wi ll do very little to reduce the ri sk o r financial cri ses occurrin g in the future, and that the G 7 Report underplayed th e role of exchange rate regimes in emerging economi es in the overa ll architectura l effort.
The G7's Focus for the Future Finally, many authors in this vo lum e have c lear view a to how the G7 should proceed in the future. Bay ne ca lls for a broadening and hilt o f attenti on, through the G7 correcting their neglect of the trade ystem as their first priority for Okinawa 2000. Thi s in vo lves reso lve th eir internal differences on trade liberali sation, restoring the authori ty of the WTO. makin g their own poli cies and th e WTO more responsive to the requirements of developing countri es, espec iall y small and poor ones. and gett in g the Millennium Round successfull y launched. Wood argues with equal conviction that in the fu ture G7 dec ision making will have to be more inclu sive of the views of certain large deve loping countri es. and that G7 countri es should give technical ass istance to LDC's to help them deve lop mechani sms to reduce systemic ri sk. Kiuchi suggests th e G7 should prov ide leadership to secure a de/acto target zone mechani sm for exchange rates among the bi g three. give the IMF authority for capital account management. and look with favour on reg ional co-operation on macroeconomi cs poli cy and th e deve lopm ent of Asian bond market.
It is Daniels who prov ided the bold est vision of the GTs req uired role in th e future. He declares th at the G7 must pl ay the essenti al tas k of managi ng the many bodi es at wo rk in reformin g the international fin ancial architecture. To do so it must co-ordinate the overall process. serve as a dr iv ing force for the implementation of agreements, and act as the lead ing advocate of benet i ts of capital account liberali sation. It is thu s clea r that. despi te the substanti al steps forward made by th e G7 at Co logne. their central ro le and to rm idabl e challenge in strengthenin g the international fin ancial system to meet the needs of the new millennium will re mai n active in th e years to co me.
Note
Of course thl! literature on linancia l crises and re/onns to the illlernationa l linancial archi tecture is substan tial. as evident in the collective referl!nces to thi s text. We lilCllS only a few of the most widely·distributed publications hen: so as to derive a concise sUlllmary. For an excellent symposi um on the Tequila Crisis of I <)<).j·'i5. we rcJi:r thc reader to volume 23 of the Jllurnal ()/ lJa ll~il1g and Finance ( I l)l)'i) .
